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 ABSTRACT 
“Airpower and Sovereignty in Revolution” addresses how the Indonesian Republican 
government used foreign pilots to acquire meaningful airpower during its struggle for 
independence. Samuel Crowl (2009) argued that the Indonesian revolution was successful 
because the Republican government carried out “an unprecedented ‘diplomatic revolution’” by 
attracting international support beyond Europe and the United States. Without airpower the 
Republicans would not have been able to maintain their diplomatic revolution in the face of 
increasing Dutch Isolation. This essay explores how the Republicans acquired and employed 
airpower. 
“Cambodia and the Indonesian Connection” argues that the events in Cambodia since its 
independence are better understood by examining the relationship between Indonesia and 
Cambodia from 1955 through 1975. By examining this relationship one can better understand 1) 
the neutralist course Prince Sihanouk attempted to pursue, 2) the path to the Cambodian 
genocide, and 3) the importance each state played in the other’s foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AIRPOWER AND SOVEREIGNTY IN REVOLUTION 
 As the British withdrew from Indonesia in 1946, and the Dutch stepped up their attempts 
to isolate the young revolutionary Republic, the Republican government responded by pursuing 
ways to maintain and strengthen its sovereignty. One of these ways was through the use of 
airpower. In pursuing its own airpower, the Republic sought to bring foreign aircraft and pilots 
into its skies. From February 1947 to December 1948 foreign pilots and planes, particularly 
American, Australian and British were an essential tool in the young Republic’s efforts to assert 
its sovereignty in the face of Dutch isolation. During this period, increased naval patrols by the 
Dutch, which increasingly isolated Republican held territory, and the de facto sovereignty 
granted to the Republican government through the Linggajati Agreement created the conditions 
that drove the Republican government to pursue airpower. Prior to this period neither the British 
nor the Dutch had significantly restricted Republican movement, and after this period the 
Republican government was effectively prisoners of the Dutch following the Second Dutch 
Military Action in December 1948. Without airpower during this period the Indonesian 
Revolution would have been seriously hampered because the Republican government would 
have been isolated from the international political and economic community and would have 
been unable to successfully press its cause on the international stage due to the geographic 
remoteness of the territory it held. Furthermore, its geographically fractured parts, particularly on 
the islands of Java and Sumatra, would have been increasingly isolated from each other as the 
Dutch cut off the movement of people and goods between them.  
Samuel Crowl pointed out that in addition to the standard argument that the Indonesian 
revolution succeeded because of “unyielding Indonesian armed resistance against re-occupation 
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and significant U.S. pressure on the Dutch,” the Indonesian Republican government defeated the 
Dutch through “an unprecedented ‘diplomatic revolution,’” which relied heavily on international 
support beyond the United States (US) and Europe. (2009: 238-39). According to Crowl, the 
Linggajati agreement gave the Republic the framework it needed to pursue its diplomatic 
revolution (245). However, The Linggajati agreement, which was formally signed in March 
1947, came at a time when the Dutch were solidifying their control over access to Republican 
territory. For the diplomatic revolution Crowl describes to have continued the Republic needed 
its own airpower. Without airpower the Republic would have been unable to sustain the 
momentum it had built prior to the signing of the Linggajati agreement and the course of the 
revolution would have been very different.   
Having airpower that it controlled benefited the Republican government in several ways. 
First, it provided the Republic with secure communications between its fractured parts and to its 
officials stationed abroad. The Republican government had a long-range radio capability, but this 
was easily monitored by the Dutch and did not allow for secure communications on sensitive 
matters between officials. With its own air capability the Republican government could quickly 
dispatch an official to communicate sensitive information or send timely written instructions 
without the risk of Dutch interception. In addition to secure communications, airpower also 
provided the Republic with a secure means of trade for high value items embargoed by the 
Dutch. With airpower the Republic could move items such as quinine and opium to market and 
obtain weapons and military equipment necessary to continue its struggle for independence. Its 
own airpower was necessary for secure communications and trade given the increasing Dutch 
control over movement into and out of Republican held territory. 
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Republican controlled air assets also provided the republic with increased speed and 
flexibility to address challenges that arose. At the onset of the revolution the primary mode of 
transportation connecting the Republican government internally and externally was ship. The 
distance from Jogjakarta in Java to Bukittinggi in Sumatra was more than 800 miles, and it was a 
similar distance to Singapore. The trip from Central Java to Singapore by boat took more than 
ten days (Darusman 1992:24). With airpower the trip could be accomplished in a little over five 
hours. Manila, 1700 miles from Jogjakarta, could be reached in about twelve hours. For the 
Republic to press its diplomatic revolution it needed to maintain independent and responsive 
connections to the international community. From Singapore, Manila and Bangkok Republican 
officials could continue to all parts of the globe to press their cause. Without airpower the 
Republic’s ability to affect international events in its favor would have been severely degraded.  
Additionally, it needed to maintain effective internal connections to demonstrate its sovereignty 
to the international community and its own people. In the face of Dutch isolation, it needed its 
own meaningful airpower to accomplish this.  
The international movement of Republican planes also provided a means for other states 
to validate Republican sovereignty by allowing them to enter from and depart to Republican held 
territories, despite Dutch opposition. For Republican officials and cargos to arrive and depart 
foreign airports, customs and immigration procedures had to be adapted or even invented to meet 
the bureaucratic and legal needs of various countries. These arrangements had the effect of 
recognizing the Republican government’s right to control the international movement of its 
people and resources, which amounted to international recognition if its sovereignty.  
 
Initial Conditions 
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 From the time Admiral Mountbatten’s mainly British-Indian troops arrived in Indonesia 
in October 1945 and until they handed control over to the Dutch in December1946 they made 
almost no effort to restrict the flow of Republican goods or personnel to the outside world. 
Mountbatten had neither the troops nor the temperament for such efforts, and he did not 
sypathise with Dutch desires to return to their colonial past (Cheong 2003:14). Demonstrating 
their lack of concern, in March of 1946, the British sold surplus naval landing craft in Singapore 
to traders in an effort to encourage trade with other islands. With landing crafts traders could 
load and unload cargos virtually anywhere (Yang 1998:211). British actions created an 
environment that facilitated the movement of Republicans and their goods. The Dutch for their 
part saw any trade between Indonesia and other nations, which they did not control, as 
smuggling but could do almost nothing about it (196, 214).  
Besides providing badly needed funds and supplies to the Republic the smuggling trade 
also served as a representation of its sovereignty to the outside world. A good example of this is 
found in an article published in the Washington Post on February 23rd 1947. In the article the 
Republican Minister of Economic affairs in Sumatra declared himself “the biggest smuggler in 
Southeast Asia.” The article goes on to explain the scope of the situation: 
Since last March the republic, in addition to Java, has controlled all of Sumatra except the slender Allied 
(now Dutch) bridgeheads here, at Medan and Padang. Here the new government found itself with an area of 
162,000 square miles, which is larger than California. It had 8,500,000 people to administer—and it 
controlled the source of most of the Netherlands East Indies’ oil, rubber and other valuable products 
(“Smuggling Enlivens Trade” 1947). 
 
The article continues by explaining how the Republic had a regularized customs duty collection 
system on imports and exports. It also required ships calling on its ports to arrive full of 
consumer goods if they expected to take out shipments. Interestingly, in the closing lines of the 
article the writer notes:  
The smugglers have proven useful during the republic’s first months but their day is just about over. The 
first normal commercial vessel recently cleared from Palembang carrying 200 tons of cargo (all that 
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happened to be available). For that the republic will receive foreign exchange, something which it has not 
received in the past (“Smuggling Enlivens Trade” 1947).  
 
This comment seems to signal to the reader that through smuggling the Republic has been 
transformed from a rebel creation into a legitimate functioning state and can be expected to 
continue to further expand its sovereignty. Significantly, on the same day the article was 
published the first chartered Republican flight arrived in Jogjakarta from Singapore. 
The Linggajati agreement, which was drafted in November 1946 and signed in March 
1947, also expanded Republican notions of sovereignty. As the handover of power from the 
British to the Dutch quickly approached, Republican and Dutch officials negotiated at Linggajati 
trying to obtain the best economic and political position for their sides (Cheong 2003:18). At the 
time Sjahrir was the prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic. Sukarno and Hatta had 
put him forward as the face of the government because he had not collaborated with the 
Japanese. His clean credentials, it was thought, would make the Republican leadership more 
palatable to the arriving allied forces. As it turned out Sjahrir was also far more willing to 
cooperate with the Dutch and come to a mutual understanding than other Republicans. Sjahrir 
saw the Dutch as part of the larger capitalist world and cooperation with them as necessary for 
Indonesia’s development (16). The Dutch however, feared that once the British departed more 
nationalist forces might rise up and challenge their already fragile control of the archipelago. 
This fear provided a significant motivation for the Dutch to conclude an agreement with the 
Republic (17). In the rush to conclude the Linggajati Agreement both sides chose to leave the 
terms vague in a hope they could use them to their advantage in the future (19).  
The Linggajati Agreement recognized “the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as 
exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra” (qtd in Taylor 1960:464). From 
this recognition the Republican leaders “took the view that the Linggajati Agreement conferred 
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sovereignty on the Republic.” With this sovereignty the Republic felt it could take open 
measures to overcome the Dutch blockade. Additionally, through the Linggajati Agreement the 
Republican government created a legal framework to present itself to the outside world (Cheong 
2003:19). It could now provide corporations and states with an internationally legible, legal 
justification for conducting business and trade with it.  
As the Republic was formalizing its sovereignty, the Dutch were trying to erode it. 
Leading up to and throughout the Linggajati negotiations the Dutch were attempting to further 
isolate the Republican government. Under the British they had been unable to take measures to 
curtail Republican trade and financing through operations on land so they turned to their Navy. 
In mid 1946 the Dutch Navy began seizing ships it deemed as smugglers, which significantly 
raised the costs of trade in Republican controlled areas (Yang 1998:210). Shortly after the 
departure of the British the Dutch moved to further restrict trade by announcing the Import-
Export Trade Regulation of January 28th 1947. This regulation made illegal (in Dutch eyes) “any 
import-export activity that did not comply with any of the rules”. The rules included the 
requirement that all ships call on certain specified Dutch ports and submit to inspections for 
illicit goods. The rules also required a Dutch license to trade in any produce that could have 
possibly come from an estate whether it did or not. For example, no local rubber could be 
exported from the northern third of Sumatra or from anywhere in Java without a license obtained 
in a Dutch port after submitting to an inspection. Additionally, “goods suitable for military 
purposes or suitable for the manufacture of goods for military purposes were prohibited from 
being imported” (223). These regulations were merely a formalization of the Dutch blockade 
policy (Cheong 2003:146). Through them the Dutch attempted to further isolate the Republic and 
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deny it its sovereignty (Yang 1998:224). To strengthen its sovereignty and overcome the Dutch 
blockade the Republic turned to foreign pilots and their planes. 
 
Building an Air Force 
At the start of the revolution the Republic had no meaningful air capability. Under Dutch 
rule there had been one Indonesian bomber pilot, one pilot of a reconnaissance plane and no 
civilian pilots. Under the Japanese no Indonesians were trained to fly (RI 002 2009:36). When 
the Japanese surrendered they left numerous broken fighter and bomber aircraft, but they left 
only a few small biplanes and single engine reconnaissance planes that were able to fly (Sejarah 
Operasi Penerbangan 1980:18). These planes were extremely limited in cargo capacity and 
range. Despite this weak position the Republic decided to pursue the development of an aviation 
sector. Efforts included, attempting to cobble together the various parts of planes into working 
planes, building a plane from the parts of six old Harley Davidson motorcycle engines, and 
training new Indonesian pilots to fly using Indonesian built gliders (13-14). These efforts met 
with very little success. If the Republic was going to use airpower in a meaningful way, it would 
need outside support.  
Petit Muharto, a Republican Air Force officer, is credited with developing the air option 
to overcome the Dutch control of travel and trade. At the end of World War II the world was full 
of excess aircraft and experienced pilots who had gained a taste for flying and adventure 
(Darusman 1992:21). Some of them after returning to their homes still wanted to fly, but they 
were unable to find jobs in the Western civilian aviation world, so they turned to Southeast Asia 
(Montlake 2010). Muharto came to aviation from a different direction. He had no flying 
experience but desperately wanted to fly. As a child he was fascinated with planes and wanted to 
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become an aeronautical engineer but had been unable to fulfill his dream (RI 002 2009:35). 
When the revolution broke out Muharto was a schoolteacher. The teachers and students of the 
school where he taught were initially formed into fighting units, but eventually they were 
disbanded and informed they would be retrained by the Army. In February 1946 Muharto 
unexpectedly saw a red and white Republican plane flying over Jogjakarta and was overwhelmed 
with emotion. From this experience he decided to leave the Army and become an Air Force 
officer, despite being told not to expect any flight training (36). While on his way to an 
assignment in Australia he became stranded in Singapore and began to work on developing the 
air option to overcome the Dutch blockade (Darusman 1992:21). From Singapore he also 
traveled to Manila, and between the two locations he was eventually able to convince a number 
of foreign aviation companies to make flights to Republican Indonesia (RI 002 2009:37).  
Commercial Air Lines Incorporated of the Philippines (CALI) flew the first blockade 
running flight on February 23th 1947 from Kalang Airport in Singapore to Maguwo Airbase in 
Jogjakarta, despite objections from the Dutch. An American piloted the first CALI flight with a 
Filipino co-pilot and crew, complete with flight attendant. There were five passengers on board 
including Petit Muharto. The plane was a US made C-47 “Dakota.” (Darusman 1992:21).  
The arrival of a Dakota into the Indonesian revolution was a momentous event for the 
Republican resistance. Dakotas were the most important and successful transport aircraft of 
World War II. They had a range of 1600 miles (see Map 1.1) and could carry as much as 7000 
pounds of cargo (“C-47 (aircraft)” 2013). Several other Dakotas eventually flew for the republic, 
including one that flew exclusively for the Republic and was designated RI-002. Dakotas 
provided the Republic the means to press their diplomatic revolution. By bringing Dakotas into 
their struggle, and one under its exclusive control, the Republic could pass key 
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government officials, personnel, and supplies virtually unopposed over the Dutch blockade. 
Confidential communications by courier or face-to-face leader meetings were suddenly possible 
with only a minimal amount of advanced notice. Additionally, resources and personnel could be 
moved tremendous distances in a matter of hours instead of weeks or months. This ability to 
move freely, between its fractured parts and outside its territory, was a direct display of the 
Republic’s sovereignty. With its own airpower, capable of long-range flight, the Republic moved 
from being completely dependent on other states to a state that could begin to chart its own 
course.      
The first CALI Dakota flight was quickly followed by a second. These flights 
demonstrated the feasibility and benefits of using the air as a means of connecting the Republic 
with the outside world and binding the separate parts of the Republic together. If, however, the 
use of the air was going to expand more airfields were needed. Specifically more airfields were 
needed in Sumatra. Therefore, the Republic targeted Gadut Airbase near the town of Bukittinggi 
for expansion of its air operations. Gadut was chosen for its strategic location and because it was 
close to town. The problem was, however, that the airfield had fallen into disrepair and was in no 
condition to receive aircraft. Before aircraft could land there serious preparations needed to be 
made (Sejarah TNI 2004:100).   
Given the Dutch naval blockade, the Indonesian government was having trouble moving 
personnel between Sumatra and Java, so it was decided to have two Indonesian Air Force 
officers, Sudjono and Soekotjo, jump onto the airfield and organize local efforts to make the 
necessary preparations for future flights (Sejarah TNI 2004:100-02). If one stops for a moment 
and contemplates the risks inherent in a parachute jump, and the fact that the amount and quality 
of parachutist training available to the Republic was minimal, the audacity to insert personnel 
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into Bukittinggi by parachute is truly amazing. This jump was a bold step in strengthening 
Republican sovereignty. 
 Aside from being audacious from a military perspective the jump seems to have turned 
into a community event as well. According to an official Indonesian Air Force history on March 
20th 1947 the republican radio station announced that there would be a parachute jump over 
Gadut airbase on the 24th. For several days in advance people gathered at the airfield in 
anticipation of the jump. On the 24th at ten in the morning, the third CALI flight piloted by 
Bobby Freeberg (the future pilot of RI-002) circled the airfield a few times then Sudjono and 
Soekotjo jumped. Both landed safely, although one apparently drifted into some banana trees. 
The successful parachute operation led to the opening of Gadut as planned with the assistance of 
locals. The opening of Gadut set off a chain of airfield openings as the Air Force moved to open 
all the airfields in Sumatra (Sejarah TNI 2004:101-02).  
In order to broaden its market beyond Manila and Singapore the Republic employed the 
services of John Coast. John Coast was an Englishman who had become enamored with 
Indonesia while detained as a prisoner of war in Thailand during World War II. After his release 
he found himself drawn to support the Republican cause and eventually left the British Foreign 
Service to assist in advancing the cause of the Republic. For his first assignment he was asked to 
arrange for ten contract flights from Bangkok to Jogjakarta (Coast 1952:68). His experiences 
arranging and flying on these flights provide a valuable glimpse into the hazards that companies, 
pilots, and planes faced flying in Indonesia during the revolution. 
 
The Obstacles and Risks of Flying for the Republic 
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Despite the large profits that could be made flying for the Republic there were numerous 
reasons not to fly. While the Republic felt the Linggajati agreement gave them sovereignty they 
still had to convince other states and businesses that it did. Thailand and British controlled 
Singapore for example were sympathetic to the Republican cause, but initially they were not 
prepared to openly recognize the Republic as a separate sovereign entity. This led to a great deal 
of uncertainty. Commercial charter flights from Bangkok, landing in Singapore to refuel, risked 
not being allowed to continue to Republican territory if the civilian aviation authorities were not 
in the right mood. If they departed under the pretext they were going elsewhere and then flew 
directly to Republican territory they risked having their landing rights for their other more 
regular flights to Singapore revoked (Coast 1952:75). Another concern related to sovereignty 
was customs procedures. While there generally were no customs procedures at airfields in 
Republican Indonesia they were an expected part of the arrival and departure process for 
Thailand and Singapore. To meet their need for proper forms Thai customs authorities created a 
special form “to be completed by persons going to and returning from ‘countries where Siamese 
[Thai] consular officials do not exist’” (120). Another issue was passports. As one Republican 
government official, who flew from Jogjakarta to Singapore on “an old Dakota piloted by an 
American ex-bomber captain,” explained: “our passports were just pieces of paper with President 
Sukarno’s signature and our names and a description of our physical characteristics.” According 
to the official he was never asked to produce his passport in Singapore (Hanifah 1972: 217-18).  
Despite uncertainty, Singapore too turned out to be a fairly reliable departure point for 
Republican flights (Darusman 1992:21). 
Technical obstacles were another impediment. For security reasons most planes wanted 
to takeoff and land in the dark. Landing on an unlit runway was not a feasible option, so the 
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runways were illuminated with flares (Coast 1952:193). The runway surfaces were also not the 
best. It appears that Maguwo in Jogjakarta, with its metal runway, was the only airfield that was 
much better than a bumpy grass strip (85). In heavy rains grass runways could become dangerous 
imposing additional risks (129). Even if runways were no problem, fuel was. In Republican held 
territory there was only 90 octane fuel not the 100 octane fuel the large transport aircraft required 
(74). The lower octane fuel could combust prematurely and cause engine failure in the hot 
tropical climate during takeoff. Once the plane reached a cooler altitude the lower octane fuel 
would perform sufficiently well, but first the plane had to make it to a cooler altitude (McNiven 
2013). To overcome this problem pilots would save a reserve tank with the necessary high-
octane fuel for takeoffs (Coast 1952:75). This meant any time they chose to fly lower to avoid 
Dutch detection they would have to burn the fuel they would need to get off the ground again. 
 The austere conditions of Republican airfields compounded the effects of minor mishaps 
and maintenance issues and led pilots to take additional risks. If aircraft needed to be repaired 
while in Republican controlled territory the pilot was the primary mechanic and long waits could 
be expected for parts since most parts had to be acquired on the international market and then 
brought to Republican airfields. Not willing to wait pilots would attempt risky repairs. While 
preparing to depart from Bukittinggi on its way to Siborong-borong Airbase in North Sumatra to 
continue fuel delivery for Sukarno’s tour, the crew of RI-002 found themselves taking one of 
these risks after its landing gear inadvertently collapsed (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 
1980:80). John Coast was on hand and provides a vivid description of the event: 
Just as R.I. 001 [sic] started to rev. up the first of her engines, we observed the uncanny spectacle of the 
plane’s port under-carriage gently buckling under her, while the whole plane tipped slowly over, leaning, it 
seemed, on the port wing. The engine stopped immediately and we, together with dozens of Indonesians, 
ran over to the strip. 
 
Bob, leaning out of his cockpit window and, rather flushed, explained, “Christ, that’s what comes of taking 
a chance with your hydraulic gear—took the pins out [of the landing gear] too soon. Ninety-nine times out 
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of a hundred you’d get away with it. It sure looks as if the President will have to use a United Nation’s 
plane now!” 
 
During the next two hours, swearing redly in the open sun, Bob directed a gang of porters who, lacking 
anything in the nature of a jack, lifted the plane by the sheer strength of their arms and backs on to a wedge 
of wooden baulks that they slipped, one by one, under the planes wing close up to where it joined the 
plane’s body. Only two of the three blade-tips showed traces of mud; furthermore, the ground was 
remarkably wet—too wet, in fact, for take-off under normal flying regulations. 
 
During that whole afternoon Bob worked on the hydraulic gear in order to lower his under-carriage again, 
and by night-fall declared himself satisfied. The wing itself showed ripples, though only faint ones, along 
most of its length, but on walking along it and feeling here and there with his foot, Bob had said there was 
nothing serious to fear; and as the pile of wood grew under the plane’s body so that the wing-tip came out 
of and up from the ground, the dents appeared to straighten out of their own accord. 
 
When the following morning we drove down for the take-off of our own plane to Jogja, we found Bob once 
more running his engine. He grinned at us, “I don’t know why I do this, I’m not that foolish really; or that 
young.” And half a minute later, despite Dave Flower’s strong disapproval, the plane gathered speed down 
the runway, made a clean take-off and flew straight up to Tapanuli [Siborong-borong], in North Sumatra. 
Such was Bob Freeberg (1952:128-29).  
    
Another serious impediment to participation in the Republican air market was the 
uncertainty of the schedule. Due to the risk of Dutch interception there was hesitancy on the part 
of pilots and the Republican government to establish a regular, predictable flight schedule, but to 
meet their other obligations airline companies needed schedules. Charter companies flew regular 
scheduled routes in addition to their Indonesian flights. This meant they needed to work their 
Indonesian trips into and around other regular service without disrupting their regular schedules. 
In the case of flights from Thailand the risks of a regular schedule was overcome by alternating 
refueling stops and arrival destinations to make themselves less predictable (Coast 1952:74-75, 
122). Another scheduling problem was Republican leaders tendency to try and change the 
schedule mid flight. For example, on the first flight from Thailand republican leaders wanted a 
significant change in the schedule once the flight had begun nearly derailing the entire 
relationship with the airline (79-80). The concern over Dutch interception was not without 
justification.  
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As the First Dutch Military Action unfolded in late July 1947, Republican Air Force 
leaders contemplated how to respond. Most of their aircraft were destroyed while on the ground 
during the opening hours of the attack. A few planes however were spared at Jogjakarta because 
of bad weather over the area. In the early morning hours of July 29th 1947 the Republican Air 
Force was able to put three of these planes in the air. One of these planes was a Japanese dive-
bomber that had been cobbled together from broken planes and spare parts left by the Japanese at 
the end of World War II. It was outfitted with one 400 kilogram bomb. The other two planes 
were small biplanes retrofitted to carry two 50 kilogram bombs. The dive-bomber struck 
Semarang. At the same time the biplanes struck Salatiga and Ambrawa. These attacks 
immediately brought Dutch aircraft to Maguwo in Jogjakarta to retaliate. After their initial strike 
the Dutch sent out periodic patrols throughout the day to monitor the situation at Maguwo 
(Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:40-46). 
 Despite the heightened activity, in the early afternoon, a Republican Dakota charter flight 
with the Indian registration number VT-CLA left Singapore for Maguwo. An Indian 
businessman who was planning on donating the plane to the Republic provided the Dakota. Its 
pilot was Alexander Constantine, an Australian who had flown in the Royal Air Force. The rest 
of the crew consisted of a British copilot, Indian flight engineer, and Indonesian radioman. Just 
before departure a shipment of medical supplies provided by the Malayan Red Cross arrived at 
the airport and several passengers had to be removed from the flight to accommodate the 
supplies. In the end when it left Singapore there were five passengers on the plane including 
Constantine’s wife and two Indonesian Air Force Generals retuning from meetings in India. As it 
approached Maguwo and was preparing to land two Dutch fighters appeared and shot it out of 
the sky. It crashed about two and a half kilometers from the runway, and only one Indonesian 
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passenger survived (Darusman 1992:37-38). This event served as a potent reminder of the 
potential risks involved in flying in support of the Republic.  
 
Bobby Freeberg and RI 002 
Bobby Freeberg, a former US Navy Bomber pilot in the Pacific during World War II and 
the pilot of CALI’s third flight to Indonesia, became the most important pilot in the Republican 
Air Force during the revolution. Freeberg was important for several reasons. As previously 
mentioned he delivered the paratroopers to Bukittinggi, which played a key role in opening up 
Gadut Airbase and numerous other airfields in Sumatra. Another thing that set Freeberg apart 
from other pilots that the Republic recruited was his commitment to the Republican cause. In a 
letter he wrote to his family he shared his feelings about the Republic: 
It isn’t generally known but the Dutch are saying one thing and doing another. They are still trying to keep 
the Indonesian people conquered but I think it impossible for the Dutch to ever again do that. The people 
are all very strongly united against the Dutch and everywhere you go they shout their slogan of, “Merdeka” 
(freedom). The people are poor and haven’t proper clothing, transportation nor weapons o [sic] wage a war 
but they will stand to the last man against the Dutch. It is pretty wonderful to see a people believe in the 
freedom we Americans enjoy ready to fight for the achievement of this view. I for one believe that the 
Dutch should be stopped because they are still using the policies of oppression toward the people of 
Indonesia. Apparently, they have forgotten how bitterly they hated being subjects to the Nazis (qtd in RI 
002 34-35).      
 
Once during a refueling stop in Labuan the local Dutch consul nearly succeeded in 
convincing the British military authorities to detain Freeberg’s Indonesian passengers, but 
Freeberg vehemently objected. Freeberg’s passengers included six Indonesian Air Force cadets 
on their way to Manila to attend flight training on the Mustang fighter. Freeberg apparently used 
his record as a veteran World War II pilot and threats of “over my dead body” to persuade the 
British soldiers to let him and his passengers continue unmolested (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 75-76). Freeberg’s attitude and action did not go unnoticed by the Indonesian 
people. During his stays at the Hotel Merdeka in Jogjakarta, according to John Coast, “the staff 
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hero-worshipped him and embarrassed him by giving him specially prepared food.” Coast also 
pointed out that despite routinely being owed large sums of money by the Republic for his 
service Freeberg continued flying (Coast 110). 
According to John Coast, Freeberg had a reputation as “a great racketeer who, by his 
blood-curdling stories of Republican dangers, endeavored to dissuade other flying-men from 
entering his Indonesian preserves.” Coast, however, rejected this assessment and found Freeberg 
to be “one of the best of men and the most excellent ambassador for the US in Indonesia” 
(1952:110). Whether Freeberg was “a great racketeer” or a genuine partisan, from Coast 
comments, it is clear that his willingness to fly for the Republic drew the attention of his fellow 
foreign pilots and likely paved the way for others to join the Republican cause as direct hires 
instead of as part-time charters. 
 His reputation as a racketeer and teller of  “blood-curdling stories” may have evolved out 
of the circumstances surrounding his first independent flight to Indonesia. During his CALI 
flight Freeberg was accompanied by Muharto as a guide. Muharto, however, was not able to 
accompany Freeberg to Manila and therefore gave him some simple instructions to find his way 
back to Maguwo Air Force Base outside of Jogjakarta. Freeberg was told to fly to Labuan in 
British Northern Borneo; head south across the Java Sea until he came to the North coast of Java; 
watch for Mount Muria on the right (West); keep heading South until the train tracks and follow 
the track West until he came to Maguwo Airbase outside of Jogjakarta (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:72-73). While Freeberg apparently had a reputation for being fearless and 
knowing  “every island and inlet in the Pacific” he was, nevertheless, not without defect because 
he failed to find Maguwo Airbase on his first try (RI 002 2009:34, 38).  
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On the other hand perhaps the circumstances under which he assembled his crew were to 
blame. According to several sources Freeberg was the owner of the plane he contracted to fly 
(Coast 1952, Montlake 2010, RI 002 2009). Initially however, he was likely not the sole owner 
of the plane. The most detailed account of Freeberg’s entry into Indonesian service is found in an 
official Indonesian Air Force history compiled from a conference consisting of many of the 
Indonesians involved in Freeberg’s recruitment and missions. This account asserts that Freeberg 
was only a part owner of the plane he proposed to use. According to this history, the plane was 
jointly owned with other pilots. The pilots had apparently purchased a Dakota for 10,000 US 
dollars from a war surplus facility at Clark Air Base on Luzon in the Philippines  (Sejarah 
Operasi Penerbangan 1980:72). Owing to the detail with which events are described and the 
individuals involved in compiling this account it is likely the most accurate. Air Force Major 
Petit Muharto, Freeberg’s recruiter, guide, most regular copilot and close Indonesian friend, for 
example, was a contributor as were several other Indonesians that would have known Freeberg 
well.  
According to this history Freeberg’s plane was “hidden” by his partners at Kalagan 
Airport in Manila to prevent him from flying it to Indonesia. Upon locating the plane Freeberg, 
deceptively, convinced two Filipino flight engineers to accompany him on a nighttime “test 
flight” and was off to Maguwo Airbase. As planned, Freeberg stopped and refueled in Labuan 
and continued south. Freeberg never located Mount Muria or the railroad tracks, and he found 
himself running out of fuel over the South coast of Java near Tasikmalaya about 150 miles west 
of Jogjakarta and was forced to make an emergency landing on the beach in the Sub-district of 
Cibeureum on June 6th 1947 (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:73). 
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Fortunately, Freeberg’s plane sustained no serious damage. Unfortunately, the plane 
began to sink into the soft sand and was soon quite stuck. Aside from providing fuel for 
Freeberg’s plane, local officials in Cibeureum radioed Tasikmalaya, which in turn contacted 
Maguwo in Jogjakarta. An undoubtedly surprised Muharto was soon in a biplane on his way to 
Tasikmalaya to assist in Freeberg’s rescue (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:73-74).  
The rescue of Freeberg’s plane is a testament to the determination of the local populace 
to assist the new Republic. The sand on the beach was too soft and despite several attempts 
Freeberg was unable to fly his plane free even on a makeshift runway of palm fronds (Sejarah 
Operasi Penerbangan 1980:74). Finally, with the help of 15 villages weaving strips of bamboo 
into a 300-meter runway Freeberg was able to get back in the air (RI 002 2009:38). Once 
airborne Freeberg headed to Cibeureum Airbase about 30 miles away in Tasikmalaya to finish 
refueling his plane and take on a load of quinine. From there he continued on to Jogjakarta and 
arrived on June 9th 1947 (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:74).    
At Maguwo Airbase in Jogjakarta Freeberg added vanilla beans and passengers to his 
load and on the 10th after the Indonesian Air Force officially designated his plane RI-002, 
Freeberg and crew were on their way to Manila (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:74). 
Freeberg’s plane was the first officially designated plane in the Indonesian Air Force but was 
designated RI-002 (RI 002 2009:38). RI-001 was reserved for the future plane of the President of 
the Republic (Montlake 2010). For the trip to Manila Freeberg’s crew included Muharto as “co-
pilot” and the two Filipino flight engineers who began their journey under the auspices of a 
nighttime test flight. Additionally, Freeberg’s passengers included two Indonesian Army officers 
from Bandung’s Siliwangi Division tasked with selling the quinine. 
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This flight to Manila is another reason Freeberg was the most important Republican pilot. 
With his plane designated RI-002, this flight marked the first international flight for a 
Republican designated plane. Upon arrival in Manila RI-002 and its cargo were detained by the 
local authorities in response to a request from the Dutch. The Dutch asserted that the quinine was 
stolen from a Dutch owned factory in Bandung and wanted to recover it (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:74). After several weeks of legal wrangling and in large part due to the 
sympathetic attitude of the Filipinos towards the republic, the Filipino authorities released the 
plane and cargo (RI 002 2009:38). In the end, RI-002’s arrival in the Philippines provided the 
Philippines an opportunity to recognize the Republic’s sovereignty and keep the issue of its 
independence alive in the Philippine press.  
Aside from added publicity Freeberg provided real value to the development of 
Indonesian airpower by willingly providing flight and technical training to numerous Republican 
airmen. After his first flight Freeberg’s crew seems to have been made up of Indonesians who 
were routinely changed out several times during missions to give other airmen the opportunity to 
gain experience with flight operations (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:80). Frequent 
changes in crewmembers, however, increased the risks during flights. A cohesive and well-
trained crew would have been much better prepared to respond in emergencies. Keeping the 
same personnel would have had the benefit that all members of the crew would better understand 
and execute their duties. Each member through experience would have known exactly what was 
expected of him by his fellow crewmembers. Certainly, as an experienced naval aviator this 
would not have been lost on Freeberg. Despite this there seems to be no account of Freeberg 
trying to change the situation, which greatly benefited the Republic.  
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Clearly, the Republican Air Force understood the need to have as many experienced 
crewmembers as possible if it was going to move from contract aircraft to state owned aircraft. 
RI-002 and Freeberg provided the Republic with an indigenously controlled training asset that 
once again allowed it to move boldly toward this goal. Freeberg also helped make this goal a 
reality by carrying President Sukarno on a tour of Sumatra in July of 1948 to raise funds for the 
Republic’s own Dakota, which would carry the designation RI-001 (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:88). 
Sukarno’s tour of Sumatra to raise funds for RI-001 was wildly successful and 
demonstrates the unifying affect airpower had on the Republican cause. The plan was to target 
the population centers of Sumatra. To support his efforts, a workshop at Maospati Airbase 
created 25 miniature Dakotas for Sukarno to give as gifts to the local committees responsible for 
fundraising efforts. It was hoped that the models would increase their enthusiasm for the project. 
Sumatra was targeted because of its better financial position. After Sukarno’s first speech at the 
Hotel Aceh in Kutaraja a committee was formed to assist in raising the funds and within two 
days it raised 130,000 Straits Dollars. By August all the necessary funds were raised and the 
officials responsible for purchasing RI-001 assembled in Singapore with the funds, which 
consisted of cash and 20 kilograms of gold (Sejarah Perjuangan 1979:5). Most of the funds 
came from Aceh (RI 002 2009:39).  
Purchasing RI-001 however, took longer than planned. It was assumed once the funds 
were available a quality plane could be purchased immediately in India. As it turned out it took 
three months. In addition to the plane, spare parts including an extra engine were purchased. RI-
001 was christened “Seulawah” (Golden Mountain) in honor of the contribution made by the 
people of Aceh (Sejarah Perjuangan 1975:5-6).  
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About the time RI-001 was available for service Freeberg and RI-002 disappeared. On 
September 29th 1948 it took off on its last flight. Having just returned to Maguwo from six 
weeks of maintenance in Manila (Coast 1952:210). The plan was to fly a route beginning in 
Jogjakarta to Gorda in West Java, Tanjungkarang in Lampung, and end at Gadut outside of 
Bukittinggi. At Gorda it picked up 20 kilograms of gold from the Cikotok mines to be used to 
purchase another Dakota. In Tanjungkarang a second copilot and radio operator were picked up 
to give them flight experience. All went as planned and RI-002 left Tanjungkarang Airbase 
heading to Bukittinggi without incident. An hour later RI-002 failed to make its scheduled radio 
check and was never heard from again (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:80-81). 
Immediately, it was assumed that RI-002 had been forced down and was being held by the 
Dutch. A US Senator and family friend is reported to have told Freeberg’s family that he was 
being held captive and negotiations were underway for his release (Montlake 2010). The Dutch 
however denied claims of involvement and no evidence has ever linked them to RI-002’s 
disappearance.  
 
The Espina Affair 
Another event that demonstrates the way international air connections helped gather 
support for the Republic and keep its cause in the press began after RI-002’s first international 
flight to Manila in June 1947. While RI-002 was in Manila, the Philippines Army Intelligence 
organization began to warm to the cause of the Indonesian revolution and offered training 
assistance and weapons sales. Training assistance was provided in the form of an officer named 
Captain Ignacio Espina. Captain Espina was said be an expert in guerrilla warfare. He was 
trained in the US and had fought a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese during World War II. 
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His daily duties in Indonesia were to include training the Tentara Pelajar, a student-paramilitary 
organization, in jungle fighting and survival. Additionally, Captain Espina brought a radio which 
was set up to maintain a continuous two way connection between Manila and Jogjakarta and a 
chrome plated “tommy-gun” as a gift for President Sukarno (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 
1980:75). Most likely, the Philippine military also saw his service as a way to closely monitor 
developments in the new republic and stay informed on the communist situation there. No matter 
the Philippine’s reason for sending Captain Espina to Indonesia, RI-002’s presence in the 
Philippines provided an opportunity to gain additional support for the Republic.  
According to the Indonesian account, several months later on December 23rd 1947 as RI-
002 was about to depart to Baguio in North Luzon Captain Espina committed suicide. 
Reportedly, Captain Espina was expected to send a report to his supervisors in the Philippines 
and had forgotten to bring it to the airfield. Then while he was on his way to get the report RI-
002 departed. This in some way led to Captain Espina emotionally breaking down and 
attempting to kill himself. The older brother of Muharto, Freeberg’s co-pilot, attempted to 
intervene and was killed in his struggle with Captain Espina. Captain Espina then succeeded in 
killing himself. This information was relayed by radio to a Republican representative in Manila. 
Upon the arrival of RI-002 Muharto was informed, and because he had taken responsibility for 
Captain Espina safety in Indonesia he was given the task of informing Captain Espina’s 
supervisor of his death. Muharto’s explanation of the circumstances surrounding Captain 
Espina’s death was met with intense skepticism and interrogation. From the Philippine Army 
perspective, a communist agent murdered Captain Espina, and they demanded his body be 
returned for burial in Manila immediately (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:74-75).  
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 RI-002 quickly departed the Philippines for Jogjakarta, but before returning with the 
body of Captain Espina RI-002 was tasked with flying several VIPs and 20 Air Force cadets to 
Pekanbaru in Sumatra. As a result RI-002’s planned route was Jogjakarta-Pekanbaru-Labuan-
Manila. Sometime after midnight on December 29th 1947 RI-002 left Jogjakarta with four 
crewmembers, twenty-five passengers and a coffin containing the corpse of Captain Espina 
(Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:78).  
This was the first for flight engineer Sunaryo. According to him, earlier in the day he was 
part of a student army in Cepu about 120 miles from Jogjakarta and was preparing to board a 
train to another location when he was handed an telegram labeled “Dari AURI – Penting” (From 
the Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia – Important). Muharto, a close friend sent the 
message and requested he urgently report to Jogjakarta. Unsure what his assignment could be he 
informed his supervisor and headed for Jogjakarta on the next train. Sunaryo was asked to serve 
in the Air Force’s intelligence operations, but his first assignment was as the flight engineer on 
RI-002. Having no previous flying experience he was given a few minimal instructions on 
emergency procedures as he rode in a car out to Maguwo airfield with Muharto (Sunaryo 
1992:115-16).  
Sunaryo describes feelings of fear and pride as he flew through the dark and the Dutch 
blockade in RI-002. His feelings of fear were compounded by the awful stench of rotting flesh, 
the incessant grind of the engines, the jostling of the plane from the weather and the cold of the 
10,000 foot flight with nothing but his light tropical cotton uniform to keep him warm. He 
describes feeling very sick as a result, but for want of a place to throw up he managed to 
suppress the urge. As RI-002 approached Pekanbaru the sun finally began to rise and the 
suffering, but proud, Sunaryo took comfort in seeing that his fellow passengers appeared as 
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miserable as he felt. RI-002 circled over Pekanbaru for nearly an hour trying to find the airfield 
through the clouds. It was unable to find the airfield, so it was finally announced they would 
have to divert to Singapore before RI-002 ran out of fuel (Sunaryo 1992:114-19). 
 RI-002 landed at Changi Royal Air Force Base in Singapore at around seven in the 
morning. Changi was chosen because the British troops stationed there were generally more 
supportive of the Republic’s cause than the civilian authorities at Kallang Airport (Darusman 
1992:41-42). Permission was initially given to refuel the plane and send it on its way, but shortly 
after refueling began word arrived that the civilian authorities at Kallang Airport demanded to 
exert their jurisdiction over the flight. The civilian authorities had received word from the Dutch 
consul that weapons were hidden in the coffin. Thus, RI-002 was ordered to fly to Kallang and 
was subjected to a thorough inspection and three weeks of legal maneuvering (42). Fortunately, 
Captain Espina’s body was moved to a refrigerated morgue while it waited for RI-002 (Cheong 
2003:115). Finally near the end of January 1948 RI-002 was granted permission to leave for 
Pekanbaru. RI-002 initially headed in the direction of Pekanbaru, but eventually changed course 
for Labuan and then on to Manila with the long awaited corps of Captain Espina. At Manila 
intelligence officers inspected the corpse and were convince enough to consider the matter 
closed (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:78). Similar to RI-002’s first arrival in the 
Philippines this event provided additional yet slightly more interesting press coverage for the 
Republic. 
   
Other Pilots and Planes  
 Six months after RI-002 entered service the Republic tried to expand its fleet by 
purchasing its own transport plane. RI-003, an Avro Anson, was purchased from its Australian 
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pilot-owner in early December 1947 with 12 kilograms of gold from Aceh (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:82). An Avro Anson was a British built plane. It was originally intended as a 
coastal reconnaissance plane, but was primarily used as a training aircraft during World War II. 
It had a range of about 790 miles and could carry about a quarter of the weight of a Dakota 
(“Avro Anson” 2013). In could take off on shorter runways than a Dakota, and the Republic 
hoped to use it to carry about 8 passengers (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:82)  
The owner flew the plane to Bukittinggi from Thailand. After providing some basic 
instructions on how to fly the aircraft to an Indonesian pilot named Iswahjudi, the original owner 
and Vice Commodore Halim Perdanakusuma flew back to Thailand. On December 14th 1947 
Halim and Iswahjudi departed Thailand. They did not arrive in Singapore as planned. RI-003 
crashed in the South China Sea off the coast of Malaya. Halim and Iswahjudi were killed 
(Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:82-83).  
Halim’s loss was a significant blow to the Indonesian Air Force. He was one of their only 
experienced aviators. When World War II broke out he was attending naval training in Surabaya. 
Fearing a Japanese invasion the Dutch evacuated all of the students and instructors to more 
secure locations. Halim eventually went to the US and attended additional training there. During 
the war He served in both the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Air Force and flew 44 
missions as a navigator on Lancaster and Liberator Bombers in Europe and Asia. (“Halim 
Perdanakusuma” 2012).   
A smaller Stinson L-5 Sentinel was purchased for 13,500 US dollars as a “replacement” 
for RI-003 (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:34). The only similarity between the two planes 
was their ability to take off on short runways. The Sentinel was a small reconnaissance plane 
capable of cruising at 90 miles per hour with a range of 360 miles and could carry only a 
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minimal cargo (“Stinson L-5 Sentinel” 2013). It would have been only slightly more useful than 
the operational planes left by the Japanese. On July 7th 1948 it disappeared with its Republican 
crew on a flight between Jambi and Bengkulu (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:34).    
Wade Palmer, a Scotsman, began flying for the Republic with his Avro Anson in April 
1948. On June 1st 1948 he sold his plane to the Republic, but continued his service as a 
Republican pilot. Once sold, his former plane was given the registration number RI-004 (Sejarah 
Operasi Penerbangan 1980:83). He started flying for the republic in revenge for the death of his 
friend Alexander Constantine the pilot of VT-CLA (Coast 1952:106). RI-004 was primarily used 
for short intra-Sumatra flights and as a trainer. It also made occasional flights to Malaya to pick 
up supplies (82). In addition to Palmer, Indonesians also occasionally piloted it. It was sent to 
Maospati for a maintenance overhaul on the July 10th 1948, but never flew again. The Dutch 
destroyed it there during their Second Military Action in December of 1948 (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:83-84).   
 While all pilots most likely participated in transporting Opium for the Republic at some 
point, Ralph Cobley was probably the most involved of the known Republican pilots. At the end 
of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia about 22 tons of crude Persian and Turkish opium were 
left in Batavia. The Republican government quickly secured this and sold it as a means of 
financing its operations. Its high value relative to its size made it an extremely attractive 
commodity to export by plane particularly after the Dutch effectively crushed the overland 
opium trade through Batavia in August 1948 (Yang 1998:199).  
Cobley owned a PBY-5A “Catalina” and in July 1948 after meeting with the Indonesian 
Air Force Chief of Staff in Jogjakarta was given the registration number RI-005 (Sejarah 
Operasi Penerbangan 1980:85-86). A Catalina is an amphibious plane, meaning it can land 
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either in the water or on land. They were used during World War II for marine patrol. Catalina’s 
had a range of about 2500 miles, 900 more than a Dakota. Additionally, they had about the same 
capacity as a Dakota and could carry around 15,000 pounds including fuel and crew (“PBY 
Catalina” 2013). Loads, crew, fuel and range always needed to be optimized because an increase 
in one would necessitate a decrease in another. More cargo resulted in less fuel and less range.  
The Catalina’s ability to land on water or land made it an extremely attractive smuggling 
vessel for rebel causes in Southeast Asia. Every inlet, lake or calm river in the region could 
potentially provided a point for goods to change hands. In the most notorious case British and 
Dutch authorities near Airabu Island caught one in September 1948 loaded with 40 cases of 
weapons and ammunition (“Singapore Gun Runners Caught” 1948). The arms were probably 
either destined for Indonesian Republicans or Malayan communists. Cobley’s use of the Catalina 
as a smuggling vessel became so notorious the Australian government refused to sell three to an 
Australian businessman trying to open an Australia Jogjakarta line fearing they would become 
involved in opium smuggling (Coast 1952:186).  
Cobley was quite outspoken about his illicit activity and connections with Chinese traders 
(Coast 1952:120). Cobley was known to have flown cargos of opium to islands in the Riau group 
where the opium was off loaded to waiting boats and taken to Singapore (183). Opium was 
generally smuggled wrapped in sheets of smoked rubber and disguised as normal commodities 
(Cheong 2003:128). Unlike other Republican registered craft there is no mention of Indonesians 
participating in RI-005’s flight operations. Cobley was noted for his negative attitude towards 
Asians, particularly Burmese who he blamed for the death of his brother (Coast 1952:157). RI-
005’s smuggling days came to an end when it suffered engine troubles and had to remain in 
Jambi for several weeks for spare parts (192). When the Dutch attacked during the Second 
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Military Action in December 1948 it was still there waiting on parts. RI-005 tried to avoid 
capture by attempting a one-engine takeoff. In the attempt Cobley struck a boat and RI-005 sank 
killing pilot and crew (“Pilot Killed” 1949).  
The last plane to enter Republican service was RI-006, also a Catalina. It was piloted by 
one of its owners an American named James Fleming (Sejarah Operasi Penerbangan 1980:87). 
Fleming’s business partner was an American named McGowan. Together they owned several 
Catalina’s including the one that was caught off Airabu Island (Coast 1952:156, 217). RI-006 
also, does not seem to have ever had any Indonesians participating as crewmembers. It was 
primarily involved in a smuggling arms and ammunition, but also transported personnel 
internationally. In the early morning hours of December 19th 1948 RI-006 was flying between 
Jogjakarta and Tanjungkarang when it was intercepted by Dutch aircraft and forced to return to 
Jogjakarta. Once on the ground the Dutch detained Fleming and his crew (Sejarah Operasi 
Penerbangan 1980:87). RI-006’s capture effectively ended air operations in support of the 
revolution.   
 
Conclusion 
 From February 1947 until the Second Military Action in December 1948 foreign pilots 
and planes supported the Indonesian revolution. Through their arrival and departure in 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines they provided a means for goods and people to quickly 
and easily cross the Dutch blockade. Through them Republican leaders could quickly reach all 
parts of the globe to press their diplomatic revolution. Planes loaded with valuable commodities 
such as opium and quinine provided a means to sell high value goods at reduced costs. This 
brought badly needed funding to the Republican cause. Through their internal use they allowed 
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Sukarno and other leaders to move between Sumatra and Java to keep the Republican camp 
united. Finally, they provided an opportunity for other states to recognize Republican 
sovereignty by allowing their departure and arrival in the face of Dutch opposition.   
Foreign pilots and planes, particularly American, Australian and British were an essential 
tool in the young Republic of Indonesia’s efforts to assert its sovereignty in the face of Dutch 
isolation. They are not a separate European or Western component of the revolution, but were an 
integral part of the domestic history. Understanding how they contributed to the Indonesian 
revolution helps better understand the revolution itself. These pilots and planes were an available 
asset employed to meet the operational needs of the Republic and keep its revolutionary cause 
moving forward. They provided the Republic with secure communications, secure trade for high 
value and essential items, speed and flexibility to address changing situations, and a tangible 
means of interacting with other states that required the recognition of its sovereignty. Without 
their cooperation and support the young Indonesian Republic’s revolutionary efforts would have 
been significantly hampered because the Republic would have been increasingly isolated and 
divided as the Dutch moved to cut it off from the outside world. With them the young Republic 
was able to maintain and assert its sovereignty and keep its cause alive on the international stage. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAMBODIA AND THE INDONESIAN CONNECTION 
At first glance Indonesia and Cambodia do not seem to have much in common. Today 
Indonesia is a country of nearly 250 million people and nearly 90 percent Muslim making 
Indonesia the fourth most populous state and home to the largest Muslim community in the 
world. Cambodia by comparison, with about 15 million people, is the 68th most populous state 
and 97 percent Buddhist. Indonesia has vast natural resources and is tremendously linguistically 
and ethnically diverse. Cambodia on the other hand has comparatively few natural resources and 
the overwhelming majority of its people are ethnic Khmer (The World Factbook 2014). 
Indonesia emerged from colonial rule through a war for independence against the Dutch, but 
Cambodia obtained its independence through a more cooperative relationship with the French.  
Despite their differences, their modern histories have interacted in interesting ways that 
have significantly influenced each other. In this essay I argue that one cannot fully understand 
events in Cambodia from 1955 through 1975 without understanding the Indonesia-Cambodia 
relationship of the same period. Beginning with the Bandung Conference in 1955, President 
Sukarno of Indonesia and Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia united in a personal and 
political friendship while following similarly disastrous economic and political policies. This 
friendship helps explain the erratic course of Cambodian neutrality and set the stage for future 
Indonesia-Cambodia relations. Sukarno’s policy of non-alignment allowed Sihanouk to attempt 
to chart a neutralist course by providing an international partner and a role model to follow. 
However, as Sukarno’s own position became untenable, and Sihanouk saw the unraveling of 
Sukarno’s position, Sihanouk began to shift to the right in an attempt to shore up his domestic 
position and secure continued support from Indonesia in his struggle against domestic 
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communism and Vietnamese encroachment. Sihanouk’s shift to the right is best explained by the 
increased importance of the Indonesian relationship and his attempt to maintain it as Suharto 
came to power. If the Indonesia-Cambodia relationship was unimportant to Sihanouk he could 
have abandoned the right completely and thrown his unconditional support behind communism 
in an attempt to shore up his position. Ultimately, however, Sihanouk’s own political position 
became so untenable that he was removed from office by the right and was forced to join with 
the communists.   
Additionally, an examination of both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge’s comments about 
Suharto’s destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) helps to shed some light on 
Cambodia’s path to genocide by highlighting that people in Cambodia were considering their 
own fates in terms of the Indonesian genocide. This is not to say that the Indonesian genocide led 
directly to the Cambodian genocide, but it is apparent that the Indonesian genocide served as an 
example of one possible course for the struggle between the left and the right. Most likely, it led 
to the Khmer Rouge’s decision to begin their armed struggle and may have affected their 
decision to carryout their political genocide.  
Lastly, the continuity in the Indonesia-Cambodia relationship, as heads of government 
changed in both countries, highlights the importance of the Indonesia-Cambodia relationship to 
both sides. For Cambodia Indonesia provided a possible patron to assist in maintaining itself in 
the face of internal and external threats. For Indonesia, Cambodia was important for reasons of 
image, opportunity and personal connections. Since independence the Indonesian government 
viewed Indonesia as destined to become a significant player on the international stage. To fulfill 
this vision of its international role, Indonesia needed places and issues it could hope to influence 
given its limited capabilities and resources. As one of the smallest countries in Southeast Asia 
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and in the absence of a strong colonial patron, following the conclusion of the First Indochina 
War, Cambodia was one of the few places Indonesia could hope to have real regional influence. 
Once Sukarno established his friendship with Sihanouk, the Indonesian government became 
engaged in a relationship that needed to be maintained as a symbol of Indonesian influence in the 
region. Additionally, the relationship was likely fairly easy to maintain because of the numerous 
connections between the Indonesian and Cambodian government that had been established 
during the years of Sukarno and Sihanouk’s friendship. 
 
The Bandung Conference and Cambodian Neutrality 
Immediately following independence, Cambodia began to align with Indonesia through 
its attendance at the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The 
conference, also commonly referred to as the Bandung Conference, arose out of a proposal 
Indonesia presented at a conference of the foreign ministers of Ceylon, Burma, India and 
Pakistan held in Colombo in April 1954. Indonesia proposed that a conference of Asian and 
African states be held for the purpose of deescalating the tensions of the Cold War and to 
continue to confront colonialism. The conference was a huge success for Indonesia. It was 
attended by nearly 30 states and more than 400 journalists. The success of the conference helped 
lift Indonesia to a place of respect in the international community and also served to strengthen 
its claim to an independent and active foreign policy (Leifer 1983:39-40). 
As the Bandung Conference approached, Norodom Sihanouk was still the King of 
Cambodia. However, he was by no means in the political driver’s seat. The 1954 Geneva 
Conference required that elections for a new Cambodian government be held in 1955. As the 
king, Sihanouk was not a member of any political party. To his dismay, the Democratic Party, 
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which had been responsible for reducing his powers in the 1947 constitution, was poised to do 
very well in the 1955 elections. Additionally, a number of the Democrat’s younger members 
were critical of what they saw as Sihanouk’s pro-US policies following the Geneva Conference. 
They called for Cambodia to follow a neutral foreign policy. Furthermore, a newly formed pro-
communist party, know as the People’s Group, also called for a neutralist foreign policy. 
Together these two parties were expected to secure a majority of the Assembly seats in the 1955 
election. In early March 1955, likely fearing a serious decline in his position and believing that 
he was more popular than any of the parties, Sihanouk decided to abdicate and organize his own 
political party (Chandler 2000:176, 187-88).  
Having just abdicated and launched his domestic political campaign, the Bandung 
Conference was a success in the eyes of Sihanouk because he was able to receive guarantees of 
non-interference in Cambodian internal affairs from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) 
leader Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese leader Pham Van Dong, in exchange for agreeing to 
pursue a policy of neutrality (Pradhan 1985:48). Additionally, international giants such as 
Sukarno and Chou En-lai showered him with praise. This allowed Sihanouk to coopt his 
domestic political opposition’s neutral stance and greatly assisted his election victory in 1955 
(Chandler 2000:189). Indonesia’s initiative in the non-aligned movement provided a springboard 
for Sihanouk to propel himself to power and a seemingly viable path of neutrality to follow. This 
is not to say that Sihanouk would not have ultimately pursued a neutral path. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia’s decision to host the Bandung Conference provided a timely and organized forum for 
Sihanouk to solidify his decision to pursue a neutralist foreign policy by bringing all the leaders 
of the region together and focusing them on reducing tensions. 
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Sukarno and Sihanouk 
For the course of Indonesia-Cambodia relations, the most significant event of the 
Bandung Conference was the blossoming of a friendship between Sukarno and Sihanouk. This 
friendship set the stage for future cooperation between Indonesia and Cambodia. Following their 
first meeting, Sukarno and Sihanouk visited each other’s countries numerous times. These visits 
undoubtedly led to connections between various government officials including military officers, 
as matters of policy, logistics and security were coordinated. Additionally, as Sukarno and 
Sihanouk’s activities in each other’s countries were reported in their own domestic press an 
increased public awareness of the events and conditions in one another’s countries would have 
flowed back and forth.  
Before Sukarno and Sihanouk met they had much in common. During World War II they 
both collaborated with their Japanese occupiers. They both were the first leaders of their newly 
independent countries. Sihanouk was of royal birth and Sukarno implied that he was. They were 
both playboys, and they both had theatrical inclinations. After they met they pursued a similar 
political path. They both pursued failed and irrational economic policies, which included 
haphazard nationalization of businesses and a rejection of crucial economic aid from the US with 
little advanced planning to make up for it. They both tried to maintain a delicate balance between 
the right and the left by playing one off the other. They both became increasingly confrontational 
with the US, and in the end they shared similar political fates. They were both deposed by 
rightist military coups, and their relationships with communists ended in genocide.  
 Sihanouk and Sukarno seem to have been instant friends. In Sihanouk’s memoirs he 
recalled that during his initial meeting with Sukarno they were able to converse easily in French 
without an interpreter. Sihanouk remembered Sukarno as a “man you simply could not dislike” 
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(1990:64). Sihanouk described a deeply personal relationship with Sukarno and seems to have 
been attracted to the lavishness of his life and personality. He declared that their relationship was 
one of deep friendship and that Sukarno allowed him to be privy to the intimate details of his 
personal life. Sukarno for his part, according to Sihanouk, loved Cambodia and its people. 
Sukarno was a more frequent visitor to Cambodia than any other head of state. He visited 
Cambodia six times in five years. Sihanouk returned every visit. (63-74). Though the specific 
evidence is sparse, the friendship of the two leaders, the frequency of these visits and the 
coordination for them would have created many connections between the various government 
officials of the two countries. Additionally, the diverse nature of both Sukarno and Sihanouk’s 
own political coalitions would have allowed for many connections to remain even after they 
were both removed from power. For example, as Sihanouk’s political influence declined the state 
apparatus around him leaned increasingly to the right, and Sukarno continually maintained an 
uneasy balance with the PKI and anti-PKI forces.  
Milton Osborne has suggested that Sihanouk and Sukarno were not particularly close and 
that Sihanouk even disliked Sukarno. In a radio broadcast on September 26th 1967 Sihanouk 
reportedly referred to Sukarno as “a scatter-brained old man, fond of virgins” (1994:10). 
Osborne points out that Sihanouk’s negative comments may have stemmed from Sukarno’s 
request to marry Sihanouk’s favorite daughter Bopha Devi (12). In Sihanouk’s memoirs however 
he seems to admire Sukarno’s lustfulness rather than condemn it. Furthermore, he is critical of 
Bopha Devi’s romantic relationships claiming that her “specialty was to change husbands as 
often as a grand prix driver would switch the tires of his car” (1990:68). It is more likely that in 
September 1967, with Sukarno out of office, Sihanouk was laying the groundwork for a 
continued relationship with Indonesia. Additionally, by September 1967 Sihanouk had moved 
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solidly to the right and the last of the political left’s leadership was leaving to join the Khmer 
Rouge (Becker 1986:105, Osborne 1994:194-95). 
If, however, Osborne is correct and Sihanouk and Sukarno were not close friends the 
amount of time they spent courting each other strengthens the argument that Indonesia and 
Cambodia needed each other. Sukarno needed all the additional leverage he could muster to keep 
from being overwhelmed by the communist Chinese backed PKI. Domestically he relied on a 
delicate balance between communist and anti-communist forces to maintain his position. One 
way to strengthen his position was to appear to be lifting Indonesia’s image, and Cambodia 
because of its own weak position was one of the few places that was possible. By making and 
receiving numerous state visits between himself and Sihanouk, Sukarno could lend credence to 
the idea that he was actively engaged in an international struggle against colonialism. 
Furthermore, on the international stage, especially with the PRC, he could appear to be having 
real influence in a region becoming increasingly important to the PRC’s own political goals and 
use that influence to insure he was not suddenly deposed by communist forces.  
For Sihanouk Indonesia provided another potential patron in Cambodia’s historical 
struggle against Vietnamese and Thai encroachment. Since the fall of Angkor Cambodia’s 
borders had been shrinking, which caused Cambodia to look outwardly for a patron to protect it 
against invaders. When Thailand was strong Cambodia turned to Vietnam for help, and when 
Vietnam was strong Cambodia turned to Thailand. Eventually, with both Thailand and Vietnam 
attempting to control Cambodia the Cambodian monarch appealed to the French for help, which 
they eventually obliged by taking control of Cambodia themselves (Chandler 2000). With 
Cambodia’s historical enemies, Thailand and Vietnam, aligning with opposing international 
blocks, and France no longer a viable means of support, Sihanouk needed a new foreign patron. 
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Even though he could provide little material support, Sukarno’s credentials as a neutralist and 
leader of the non-aligned block gave Sihanouk just the boost he needed to try and chart his 
neutralist course.   
The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) held in Jakarta in 1963 and in 
Phnom Penh in 1966 provide an example of the way Sukarno and Sihanouk’s politics and 
friendship interacted. GANEFO was Sukarno’s response to the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) banning Indonesia from its organization. Indonesia hosted the 4th Asian Games in 1962, 
but refused to grant visas to Israeli and Nationalist Chinese athletes. Sukarno viewed both states 
as neocolonial creations and refused to recognize their right to send athletes to the games. 
Previously, the IOC had never expelled any of its members and offered to allow Indonesia to 
return if it would apologize and assure the IOC that the incident would not be repeated. Sukarno 
was unrepentant and declared that politics and athletics could not be separated and that he would 
organize his own international athletic event with athletes from states and organizations 
sympathetic to his cause (Pauker 1965:172-73).  
GANEFO I was well received throughout the socialist world. In all “more than 2,200 
athletes and officials from 48 countries and regions” participated in GANEFO I in November 
1963. Most athletes, however, were not of Olympic caliber because of fear of being banned from 
Olympic competition. A major exception was the PRC, which sent 238 participants, broke two 
world records and dominated the games (Lutan and Hong 2007:31). The PRC sent its best 
athletes because it did not fear IOC sanction, having withdrawn from the IOC in the 1950s (Field 
2011:10). Exactly how many Cambodian athletes participated in GANEFO I is unclear, but 
Cambodia was one of the 12 founding members of GANEFO and had at least seven swimmers 
suspended from Olympic competition because they competed in GANEFO I (30).  
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The success of GANEFO I led to the decision to hold GANEFO II in Cairo in 1967, with 
Beijing slated as the alternate site. The PRC saw that GANEFO was an opportunity for it to exert 
its influence in Asia. In September 1965 at the second Council of GANEFO held in Beijing an 
Asian GANEFO committee was formed with a representative from the PRC as the chair. The 
committee decided to hold an additional Asian GANEFO in Phnom Penh in December 1966. 
The PRC underwrote the costs for the games and helped to build the stadium for the games 
(Lutan and Hong 2007:32). Ironically, the stadium became known as the Olympic Stadium 
despite its anti-Olympic birth.1 Just days after the decision to hold the Asian GANEFO in Phnom 
Penh the events that brought about Sukarno’s downfall and the annihilation for the PKI began to 
unfold in Indonesia. Despite the changing political winds Indonesia still attended and 
participated in Asian GANEFO. Suharto’s decision to not immediately abandon the games 
hosted in Phnom Penh despite their clearly communist Chinese origins highlights the importance 
Cambodia had come to represent in Indonesia’s attempts to exert its regional influence. 
Indonesia’s relationship with Cambodia had become an important part of its international image. 
Not attending Asian GANEFO would have effectively abandoned Cambodia to the PRC.  
The slogan selected for Asian GANEFO seems to provide solid evidence for the 
closeness Sihanouk still felt for Sukarno at this time. Prior to his downfall Sukarno was pursuing 
a policy of confrontation or Konfrontasi with Malaysia over the incorporation of Northern 
Borneo into its new configuration. Sukarno viewed the incorporation of British Northern Borneo 
into Malaysia as a neocolonial plot to keep Indonesia down. Konfrontasi amounted to mostly 
                                                
1 Asian GANEFO was not the stadium’s most historic event. On April 17th 1975 it became the 
site of a failed Khmer Republic evacuation that left Prime Minister Long Boret and numerous 
other government officials stranded in Phnom Penh as the Khmer Rouge flooded into the city. 
Lon Nol’s army officers were rounded up, brought to the stadium, and executed. Long Boret and 
other elite were taken to the Cercle Sportif and beheaded on the tennis courts (Becker 1986: 160, 
192-93). 
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small skirmishes along the border separating Indonesian Borneo and British Northern Borneo. In 
Konfrontasi Sihanouk took the side of Indonesia and in August 1964 after a weeklong visit to 
Indonesia he said that he completely approved of Sukarno’s policy (“Cambodia OK’s” 1964). 
One of Sukarno’s favorite Konfrontasi slogans was “Onward, No Retreat” (“Sukarno Declares” 
1964). As Sukarno was pushed from power by Suharto this slogan was adopted and used as the 
slogan for Asian GANEFO held in Phnom Penh in November and December 1966. It has been 
suggested that this slogan was a play on the Asian Games slogan “Ever Onward”, which were 
being held near simultaneously in Bangkok (Foisie 1966), but it seems much more likely that the 
slogan originated with Sukarno and was adopted and maintained as a show of support for 
Sukarno. As host, one would expect that had Sihanouk desired he could have changed the slogan 
to something much less directly connected to Sukarno. Phnom Penh’s support for GANEFO, the 
choice of the slogan for Asian GANEFO and Indonesia’s decision to still attend Asian GANEFO 
despite Sukarno’s fall from power demonstrate the enduring influence Sukarno and Sihanouk’s 
friendship had on the relations between the two countries.  
 
Turbulent Times: 1965-1970 
Following what was officially described by the subsequent Indonesian government as an 
abortive communist coup, in 1965 the Indonesian military and vigilante groups produced a wave 
of bloodshed and carnage that led to the deaths of over a half a million people. At the start of the 
killings the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was the third largest communist party in the world. 
By the end it, it effectively ceased to exist (Kiernan 1985:ix). Prior to the destruction of the PKI 
the US government was seriously concerned that Indonesia was on the verge of becoming 
communist. Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State at the time, cautioned that “before long 
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Indonesia may be for all practical purposes a Communist dictatorship” (qtd in Simpson 
2008:146).   
 In the early morning hours of October 1st 1965 six of the top Indonesian Army generals 
were killed in what is often described as an abortive communist coup attempt. Allegedly, the 
killers of the generals acted to protect president Sukarno from a pending US backed coup, which 
the generals were planning (Elson 2001:100). The exact motivations of the coup plotters and 
those involved may never be clear and numerous competing theories have been put forward 
(110). What is clear is that on the morning of October 1st 1965, as the commander of the 
Indonesian Army’s Strategic Reserve Command, General Suharto was commanding the only 
military unit capable of resisting the coup plotters. Suharto responded vigorously and was able to 
send the coup plotters running with limited initial bloodshed. In the aftermath, however, Suharto 
and the Army launched a massive campaign of murder and detention against anyone alleged to 
be a member of the PKI. President Sukarno’s political power diminished, and he was eventually 
pushed from power in March 1966. Suharto, cast himself as the savior of the nation and 
essentially took complete control in March 1966. In March of 1967 he became acting President 
and in March of 1968 he was appointed President. Sukarno died under house arrest in 1970 three 
months after Sihanouk was overthrown.  
 From the beginning of 1964 Sihanouk had allowed military equipment from the PRC to 
be shipped from the port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam across Cambodia to Vietnamese 
communist forces in South Vietnam (Osborne 1994:172). Sihanouk placed Lon Nol, the Chief of 
the Cambodian Armed Forces, in charge of the program. Lon Nol was deeply suspicious of 
communist Vietnamese intentions and skimmed a substantial amount off the incoming shipments 
to arm his own forces (Becker 1986:102). In 1963 Sihanouk rejected US aid and the Cambodian 
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Armed Forces took a direct hit because at the time the US was paying the Cambodian Armed 
Forces. In the absence of a patron the Cambodian military’s effectiveness declined (Chandler 
2000:200). Sihanouk hoped the benefits the military derived from smuggling operations would 
make up for the lack of American aid. Ultimately, however, these smuggling operations moved 
Sihanouk one step closer to disaster (Osborne 1994:172). It also does not appear to have been 
enough to maintain Lon Nol’s unquestioning support, most likely because it led to an increased 
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, and Lon Nol viewed the Vietnamese as having a spiritually 
corrupting influence on Cambodia (Chandler 2000:203). Despite any reservations Lon Nol may 
have had, and possibly without his knowledge, by 1966 Sihanouk had moved closer to North 
Vietnam by entering into a secret formal agreement that allowed North Vietnamese forces to use 
Cambodian lands as a base of operation (194). 
In the run-up to the September 1966 elections Sihanouk was having increasing trouble 
maintaining his grip over the various factions in his Sangkum Party. Additionally, at the time 
Sihanouk was becoming increasingly isolated from the right and the left. He was unable to 
support the left in the face of mounting opposition, but was also unwilling or unable to go all in 
with the right either. He refused to give up his economic and social policies that were despised 
by the right. Having given up US aid he was no longer able to balance his budget and had 
drastically cut the military budget (Becker 1986:101). As the elections approached French 
President Charles de Gaulle was scheduled to visit Cambodia. Completely overwhelmed, 
Sihanouk decided to devote his attention to De Gaulle’s visit and opened the election to all-
comers.  
The opening of the party list led to 425 candidates from Sihanouk’s Sangkum Party 
competing for 85 assembly seats (Chandler 2000:194). According to Becker: “The rich, 
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conservative candidates bought votes and won overwhelmingly” (1986:102). This directly led to 
Sihanouk’s downfall in 1970 because none of the elected assembly members owed their seats to 
Sihanouk. Prior to the 1966 election Sihanouk had essentially handpicked all the Assembly 
members since 1951 (Chandler 2000:191).  
Becker describes Sihanouk’s near paralyzation “by the external and internal forces 
working against him” as the leading cause for his opening the election field (1986:101). 
Chandler suggests that additionally, Sihanouk was distracted with De Gaulle’s visit (2000:194-
95). Certainly both are correct, but another contributing factor to Sihanouk’s paralysis and 
distraction was likely the events unfolding in Indonesia. Sukarno, who Sihanouk was like in so 
many ways, was slipping from power.  In explaining Sihanouk’s paralysis Becker points out that 
the year before Sihanouk had attempted to host an “Indochinese People’s Conference”, but he 
only invited the communist government of North Vietnam and the communist shadow 
governments of Laos and South Vietnam to attend. Naturally, the right had not been impressed 
(1986:102). She does not mention, however, that in a show of support Sukarno flew to Phnom 
Penh to observe the conference (“Sukarno Urges” 1965). Just six months prior to the conference 
Sihanouk claimed to have obtained a promise from Sukarno to help defend Cambodia (“Reds 
Line Up” 1964). This claim does not seem too far fetched given that at the time Indonesia had 
recently received commando training from the North Vietnamese and was in the process of 
bringing Laotian forces belonging to neutralist Kong Le to Indonesia for training (Conboy 2002). 
Given the circumstances it seems completely reasonable that some of Sihanouk’s paralysis came 
from a fear that, similar to his political partner Sukarno, he was headed for political disaster 
because of his attempts to use the left to secure himself against the right.  
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Additionally, Sihanouk may have thought he was losing an important international ally in 
the neutralist camp because as Sukarno slipped from power he attracted the ire of Suharto by 
harboring a fugitive Indonesian Air Force General named Omar Dani. Following the abortive 
1965 coup Sihanouk gave refuge to Dani who had voiced his support for the coup through a 
nation wide radio address. Suharto wanted Dani returned, but Sihanouk refused. Infuriated, the 
Indonesian Army infiltrated five commandos into Cambodia through the port of Sihanoukville in 
early 1966. For cover they posed as crewmen of a shipping company. Once in Cambodia they 
passed word to Dani that he could return to Indonesia on his own, or be forcefully repatriated. 
The threat had its intended affect, and Dani returned to Indonesia to stand trial on April 20th 
1966 (Conboy 2003:153-54). 
Following the September election, in an attempt to maintain some control over events 
Sihanouk backed Lon Nol in his bid to become Prime Minister (Osborne 1994:188), Sirik Matak, 
a royal political rival of Sihanouk’s who was also close to the US, was elected Deputy Prime 
Minister. At this point Lon Nol was still considered to be loyal to Sihanouk (Chandler 
2000:195). Previously, he had served in several cabinet positions and even as Deputy Prime 
Minister. Despite his loyalty, like most of the military, Lon Nol leaned to the right and filled his 
cabinet with “some of the best-known older conservatives.” Sihanouk’s reaction was to form a 
counter shadow government to give voice to opposition policies and begin to directly challenge 
the man he had just backed for Prime Minister. Lon Nol in turn offered his resignation in late 
October 1966, but Sihanouk rejected it (Osborne 1994:188).  
 In January 1967 Sihanouk left Cambodia for his annual European vacation in the midst of 
political turmoil. Once he was out of the country Lon Nol and his government began to 
dismantle Sihanouk’s programs and specifically targeted peasants through forced rice collection 
   
 
48 
to meet the central government’s needs for revenue. This led to repressive government violence, 
which, instead of condemning, Sihanouk took full credit for by comparing the violence to 
Suharto’s activities in Indonesia. Thus, instead of distancing him self from Suharto he embraced 
his methods. In a speech responding to students protesting against the repressive actions of Lon 
Nol, Sihanouk said the following: 
Do not forget either, Messieurs les rouges, – and this is a reminder to you not a threat – that it is Sihanouk 
to whom you owe the privilege you enjoy at present of carrying out all your activities without fear of 
ending your days. Is there any need to remind you that in Indonesia there was not great difficulty in wiping 
out seven hundred thousand communists, and to point out that it is enough for me, not even to give the 
order but simply remain silent and you, who are only a few hundred, will disappear even more quickly? 
[Laughter and applause] We do not lack our Suhartos and Nasutions in Cambodia [more applause].  
  
I would also inform you that I have other radical methods of destroying your illusions, namely if I leave the 
country – temporarily – and leave you face to face with our Suhartos and Nasutions [more laughter]. 
Leaving the country without anyone knowing is something I am capable of, since I have tried it – 
successfully – by flying out two months ago without your knowledge [more laughter] (qtd in Kiernan 
1985:252). 
  
 Shortly after this speech Sihanouk began to make good on his threat in response to events 
in the village of Samlaut. On April 2nd 1967, villagers killed two soldiers near Samlaut in 
western Battambang Province. The soldiers were killed in reaction to the forced rice collection 
scheme they had been ordered to carry out. The year before one third to possibly as much as half 
of Cambodia’s rice harvest was smuggled out of Cambodia and sold to communist forces in 
South Vietnam under the watchful eye of the Cambodian Army and other government officials. 
At the time, peasants were required to sell all their surplus rice to the Cambodian government at 
an arbitrarily low price on credit. Instead however, peasants routinely sold their surpluses to 
Chinese merchants who paid a higher price in cash. The merchants then colluded with security 
and customs forces to smuggle the rice into South Vietnam (Osborne 1994:173). Two thirds of 
the entire harvest managed to avoid government taxation in 1966. Given Cambodia’s struggling 
budget, as Prime Minister, Lon Nol developed a plan to reign in the rice smuggling and increase 
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tax revenue from the rice harvest while Sihanouk was out of the country. Previously the 
government had further reduced the price it was willing to pay, and now the Army was used to 
enforce collection at gunpoint (Becker 1986:101, 103). 
 Peasants around the country were outraged at the rice collection program, but as Lon Nol 
traveled the country to explain government actions he drew large friendly crowds, something 
Sihanouk thought only he should have been capable of. This brought him back to Cambodia just 
in time to make his threatening remarks and for the Samlaut killings (Osborne 1994:190). After 
killing the two soldiers in Samlaut the peasants there went on to attack other Cambodian 
government facilities and troops in the area. Then they took to the forest. In response Lon Nol 
and Sihanouk sent in more troops to crush the rebels. The rebels however were backed and 
organized by Viet Minh cadre that had remained in the area following the First Indochina War 
(Becker 1986:103-04). The peasants fought ferociously, but outnumbered and outgunned the 
army massacred more than 10,000 of them in the area. Sihanouk took full responsibility for the 
slaughter and was completely unrepentant. Sihanouk even went so far as to call for the 
Cambodian Army to carry out a purge of the left similar to the one the Indonesian Army had 
recently unleashed (Osborne 1994:191-92).  
The upheaval of Sihanouk’s political situation caused him to begin to reorient himself to 
the political conditions at home, and he was able to use this reorientation to strengthen his 
relationship with Indonesia. Whether his remarks about Suharto and Nasution were purely for 
domestic consumption or not they would have certainly made it to the ears of the Indonesian 
diplomats in Phnom Penh and back to Suharto. In a further show of his shifting position in 
September he made the previously mentioned disparaging comments about Sukarno. Finally, in 
April of 1968, Suharto – the man that toppled Sihanouk’s “older brother” (Sihanouk and Krisher 
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1990:66) – traveled to Phnom Penh on his first foreign tour and was greeted warmly by Sihanouk 
(Roeder 1969:152, Nasution et al. 2002:32-33). Given his military background, Suharto also 
likely met with Lon Nol who was  no longer serving as Prime Minister, but remained the Chief 
of the Cambodian Armed Forces. Sihanouk’s warm embrace of Suharto is a clear example of the 
desperateness of his position and his acute need for external support to maintain himself against 
the increasing threat from Vietnam. Suharto’s willingness to overlook Sihanouk’s friendship 
with Sukarno and to include Cambodia in his first foreign tour demonstrates just how important 
Cambodia was to Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
 Ultimately, this period marks the end of Sihanouk’s ability to use the left as a political 
counter balance. As Sihanouk was driven to the right he was left without a role model to follow 
similar to the way he followed Sukarno’s lead. Ultimately, the right had no use for him, much the 
same as Suharto had no use for Sukarno. Additionally, Sihanouk’s turn to an Indonesian analogy 
could have only served to vindicate the ideology of the most extreme voices in the Khmer 
Rouge. 
Kiernan suggests that events in Indonesia may have erased any doubts that the PRC and 
Pol Pot had about the need to begin to prepare for an armed rebellion because, ultimately, 
Sihanouk, like Sukarno, would be unable to protect the Cambodian communists from 
annihilation. Ironically, unbeknownst to each other, Sihanouk and Pol Pot were both in Beijing 
when the coup began in Indonesia (1985:222). Kiernan also points to a 1977 Khmer Rouge 
document reflecting on this period: 
If our analysis failed, we would have been in greater danger than [the communists] in Indonesia. But our 
analysis was victorious, because our analysis was agreed upon, because most of our cadres were in life-
and-death contradictions with the enemy; the enemy sought to exterminate them constantly (1985:235).  
 
While it is not clear that the Indonesian genocide led directly to the Cambodian genocide, it is 
clear that as the Khmer Rouge were formulating their strategy they were thinking about events in 
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Indonesia, and it is easy to see how Sihanouk’s threat of a communist purge similar to the one in 
Indonesia may have stiffened the Khmer Rouge’s resolve to begin an armed struggle, which 
ultimately turned to genocide.  
Both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge drew on Indonesia’s experience to chart their 
courses. Therefore, the violent repression of the Samlaut Rebellion and the Khmer Rouge 
response are better understood by considering how events in Indonesia shaped both sides 
thinking. For the right, Indonesia provided a clear path to end communism. For the left, 
Indonesia provided a warning that they could not compromise with the right and could not rely 
on Sihanouk for protection. In 1967, as the Khmer Rouge began to rise up and violence began to 
spread, the remaining left-leaning politicians slipped out of Phnom Penh and joined the Khmer 
Rouge (Becker 1986:105). 
1969 was a disaster for Sihanouk and his foreign policy. In March the US began secretly 
bombing communist Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. Sihanouk was outraged. Then, later in the 
year, he moved to reestablish ties with Washington. At the same time, he gave official 
recognition to the Viet Cong’s provisional government for South Vietnam and agreed to allow 
their forces to stay in Cambodia until the conflict in Vietnam was settled (Becker 1986:111-12). 
By early 1970 the government lost control of more than one-fifth of its territory to rebel and 
communist forces (Chandler 2000:203). 
 
Suharto and Lon Nol   
In late 1969 Lon Nol was on the rise and Sihanouk was in trouble. In the fall of 1969 Lon 
Nol made contact with Son Ngoc Thanh who was a long time Cambodian independence fighter 
and enemy of Sihanouk (Becker 1986:112). In November 1969 and again in January 1970 it is 
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alleged that a small group of Cambodian Army officers secretly traveled to Indonesia to learn 
about how the Indonesian Army had forced Suharto from power (“The Periscope” 1970). This 
seems highly likely given Suharto and the Indonesian Army’s subsequent vocal support for Lon 
Nol and his regime. Suharto’s apparent willingness to assist the Cambodian military overthrow 
Sihanouk suggests that while Suharto was willing to engage with Sihanouk to maintain the 
Indonesian-Cambodia relationship he was actively working to extend Indonesia’s influence in 
Cambodia by all available means.  
 In January 1970 when Sihanouk left Cambodia for his annual vacation his departure was 
viewed by many “as a flight.” With Sihanouk away Lon Nol’s government again went on the 
offensive against Sihanouk’s programs. Sirik Matak made a secret trip to Hanoi, and was shown 
the signed agreement Sihanouk had made years earlier allowing the North Vietnamese to use 
Cambodia as a base of operations. He was enraged and shipments of Vietnamese weapons across 
Cambodia came to an end. Matak was now ready to move against Sihanouk, even if Lon Nol 
may not have been (Chandler 2000:204).  
 In an Indonesian style twist, Matak and three army officers forced Lon Nol at gunpoint to 
declare his support for a vote of no confidence against Sihanouk scheduled for the following day 
in the National Assembly. Nearly 25 years earlier a group of Indonesian youth abducted Sukarno 
and forced him to immediately declare independence from the Dutch despite his personal 
reservations. After extracting Lon Nol’s support, the National Assembly voted overwhelmingly 
to strip Sihanouk form his position as chief of state (Chandler 2000:204). Just days before his 
death, in June 1970, Sukarno lamented that Sihanouk had end up just like him. Commenting on 
Lon Nol, Sukarno said, “He is the quiet type . . . Just like Suharto”(qtd in “Sukarno Marks His 
69th Birthday” 1970).   
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Following the coup, as if sticking to Suharto’s script, Lon Nol’s forces slaughtered 
hundreds of Vietnamese civilians and rounded up thousands more into concentration camps 
under the pretext that they were all communist supporters. Writing about these events in his 
memoirs and pointing to the similarity between events in Indonesia and Cambodia, a news 
reporter who was in Phnom Penh at the time said, Lon Nol “brought in a crew of advisers from 
Indonesia . . . to learn that Lon Nol was taking notes from them on the conduct of his internal 
security was not comforting.” In another nod to Indonesia, Lon Nol announced that the desperate 
state of affairs in Cambodia required Cambodia to accept all unconditional foreign aid no matter 
the source (Anson 1989:130-31). Shortly after Suharto came to power his government made a 
similar plea for help. In his initial statement to the press Suharto’s Minister of Economics, 
Finance and Reconstruction said, “we will welcome foreign economic aid without strings 
attached from all countries” (qtd in Leifer 1983:115). Unlike Indonesia, the mass killings led to 
an evaporation of overseas support for the regime (Chandler 2000:205-06). Clearly, times had 
changed since the international community sat idly by watching the anti-communist pogrom in 
Indonesia.  
 Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Cambodia under Suharto was a balancing game 
between domestic political forces calling for closer alignment with the US and domestic political 
forces seeking to adhere to Indonesia’s professed non-alignment. One side was dominated by the 
Army, which wanted closer relations with the US, primarily for the security benefits they 
perceived, but certainly sweetened by the financial benefits they hoped to gain in terms of US 
financial support. The other side, best personified by Indonesia’s foreign minister Adam Malik, 
wanted US financial support, but was very concerned about keeping Indonesia’s long-term 
options open. Malik thought Indonesia was best served by supporting a policy of non-
   
 
54 
interference by external forces in Cambodia (Crouch 1978:330-31). These competing foreign 
policy approaches can be seen in the different responses of the Indonesian government to the 
overthrow of Sihanouk. Despite their differing approaches, both sides were seeking to enhance 
Indonesia’s international image through engagement in Cambodia. 
Suharto and the army were supportive of Lon Nol’s overthrow of Sihanouk. As 
previously mentioned, in November 1969 and January 1970 the Indonesian military likely hosted 
a small contingent of Cambodian army officers who came to Indonesia to learn how General 
Suharto and the Army had managed to oust President Sukarno from power.  
 When Lon Nol came to power in March of 1970 President Suharto and the Indonesian 
military were quick to offer their support. In April, Indonesia along with Australia, Japan and the 
US, received a “shopping list” of needed equipment and supplies from Lon Nol’s government 
(Holdridge 1970). The anti-communist Indonesian army had no qualms about supporting Lon 
Nol and even considered sending Indonesian troops to help secure Phnom Penh (Conboy 
2003:190). More restrained voices prevailed, however, and lesser means of support were 
pursued. Lon Nol specifically requested that Indonesia supply his army with two or three 
divisions worth of small arms, but Indonesia was in no position to immediately supply such a 
large quantity of weapons. Instead the Indonesia Army offered to supply about one brigade’s 
worth of AK-47s. If Indonesia was going to supply a larger quantity it need to have its weapons 
stocks resupplied by the US (Galbraith 1970).  
Indonesia had been receiving Soviet military aid through 1966, but as Indonesia became 
more pro-West the Soviets demanded cash payments for ammunition and replacement parts. This 
was quickly making Indonesia’s stock of AK-47s more difficult to maintain, so, Indonesia was 
eager to find a way to have its AK-47s replaced by M-16s (Conboy 2003:200). Providing 
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weapons to Phnom Penh was one way to demonstrate their support for a non-communist regime 
and gain benefits for themselves. In the end Indonesia only supplied Cambodia with one brigades 
worth of AK-47s gathered from an Indonesian Army commando group. This group became the 
first Indonesian unit to receive M-16s (190). A more significant contribution by Indonesia was 
not possible given its own poor economic situation and US congressional limitations on military 
assistance to Cambodia. 
Suharto’s generals, however, were not deterred in their determination to support Lon Nol 
and his regime. In September 1970 the Indonesian military sent an officer on a survey mission to 
Cambodia. Colonel Seno Hartono, a graduate of US Army Ranger School and the commander of 
the Indonesian commando school at Batu Jajar, was selected for the mission. For nine months he 
had virtually unrestricted access to the Cambodian military and its internal workings. He was 
provided a helicopter and traveled extensively, visiting numerous Cambodian units. His 
conclusion was that the most meaningful assistance Indonesia could provide was to bring 60 
Cambodian soldiers to Indonesia for commando training. The participants were selected from 
two Cambodian units. Half the trainees came from Cambodia’s best infantry unit, the 2 Airborne 
Battalion. The other half of the trainees came from the 5 Infantry Brigade, the only Cambodian 
unit made of Muslim Chams (Conboy 2003:190).  
One has to wonder if Indonesia may have had ulterior motives in selecting Cham recruits 
or if it was merely to make the endeavor more palatable at home as a show of pan-Muslim 
solidarity. One can only speculate about Indonesia’s intentions, but General Les Kosem the 
highest ranking Cham in the Cambodian Army apparently held the idea that these Cham soldiers 
could return and some day help lead the struggle for the reestablishment of Champa. He is 
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quoted as having said to the members of 5 Brigade before their departure to Indonesia “to train 
hard in order to continue the struggle for Champa” (qtd in Conboy 2003:200). 
In Indonesia the Cambodian soldiers received a five-week crash course in Indonesian, 
then refresher infantry training followed by paratrooper training and nine months of commando 
training at Batu Jajar near Bandung. Back in Cambodia many of the new commandos served as 
instructors at a new training center for reconnaissance and commando operations. At the end of 
the war the majority of the Indonesian trained troops were formed into a new commando unit and 
sent to defend the canals north of Phnom Penh, where they were annihilated by the Khmer 
Rouge (Conboy 2003:191).  
In the end, Indonesia’s military assistance to Lon Nol and his forces was not particularly 
significant, but it still demonstrates Indonesia’s desire to play a larger regional and international 
role. It also highlights Indonesia’s willingness to stand up against the PRC with whom they had 
broken diplomatic relations and who were the primary patron of the Khmer Rouge in their fight 
against Lon Nol.  
In addition to the real financial constraints Indonesia faced there were also opponents to 
military assistance in Suharto’s cabinet. Foreign Minister Adam Malik was the most influential 
opponent of military assistance to Cambodia. Adam Malik leaned farther left than Suharto and 
his generals, but had been an opponent of the PKI.  
In 1964 Adam Malik was a leader in the Murba party, a “nationalist-Communist party,” 
which had been formed in 1948 by supporters of Tan Malaka. The Murba party was despised by 
the PKI. In 1964 the Murba party moved to weaken the PKI by attempting to declare an alternate 
ideology to Marxism they termed Sukarnoism and by pushing for the consolidation of national 
parties into one conglomerate party. Sukarno, who relied heavily on the PKI to balance against 
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the Army, became concerned that the PKI would become too weak, and moved to crush the 
efforts of Murba and their associates. In the end Malik, who had previously served as Sukarno’s 
ambassador to the Soviet Union and was currently serving as trade minister, was demoted in a 
cabinet shake-up in March 1964 (Crouch 1978:64-66). Prior to the shake-up Adam Malik had 
also played a key role in negotiations with the Dutch over West Irian. His anti-PKI credentials 
and his civilian standing made him an appealing choice for Suharto’s Foreign Minister in March 
1966 (Leifer 1983:113-14).  
 Upon receiving the request for aid from Lon Nol’s government, Suharto was so 
enthusiastic about offering support that he did not consult with Adam Malik before contacting 
the US to ask for assistance with his weapons replacement scheme (Galbraith 1970). Once Malik 
was consulted Suharto seems to have tempered his enthusiasm and returned to a more focused 
determination to pursue a less blatantly pro-US course. To this end, Malik attempted to organize 
a conference on Cambodia to be held in Jakarta on May 16th and 17th 1970. Malik invited 
“twenty Asian and Pacific governments” to attend the conference with the intent of finding a 
solution to the growing conflict in Cambodia. Unfortunately for Malik and Suharto, the 
communist countries saw the conference as a US inspired endeavor and wanted nothing to do 
with it from the start. Then, shortly after invitations were sent out, the US and South Vietnamese 
forces launched ground combat operations into Cambodia from South Vietnam in an attempt to 
deny Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces sanctuary. These operations only served to 
strengthen the view that the Jakarta Conference was inspired by the US. In the end none of the 
communist and none of the other non-aligned governments attended the conference. The 
conference is an example of the regional role Indonesia aspired to. Indonesia had hoped that the 
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Jakarta Conference would lift their status similar to the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Leifer 
1983:133-35).  
As a result of the international community’s rejection, Michael Leifer describes the 
conference as “virtually a non-event”, which “had no bearing whatsoever on the cruel course of 
events in Cambodia itself” (1983:135). This view is not entirely correct. The mere organization 
of the conference strengthened the position of Adam Malik and curtailed the possibility of 
significant military support from Indonesia. At the conference when addressing how Indonesia 
planned to respond to Cambodian appeals for assistance, Malik said, “our response to the appeal 
is confined to efforts within the realm of political action and diplomacy. It is obvious to 
Indonesia that a negotiated settlement rather than a settlement by force is a prerequisite” 
(1970:69). As Leifer himself pointed out, in July 1970 Adam Malik said, “We have no arms for 
them. We just pray for Cambodia” (qtd in Leifer 1983:135).  
From Suharto’s government’s attempts to support Cambodia both diplomatically and 
militarily one can see that despite its desire to shape events in Cambodia Indonesia lacked the 
capacity to provide more than cursory support. Despite this Cambodia was important enough to 
Indonesia in its quest for international status that it risked, and ultimately experienced, failure by 
trying to influence events in Cambodia beyond its means. Despite his failure to strengthen Lon 
Nol’s position Suharto remained engaged with Cambodia.  
In March of 1975, as the military situation of the his government continued to deteriorate, 
officials in Lon Nol’s government still believed they could negotiate with the Khmer Rouge. 
Since Lon Nol was seen as the focus of Sihanouk’s and the Khmer Rouge’s anger, officials close 
to Lon Nol hatched a plan to remove him from the scene. Officials in his administration 
recommended that he travel to Hawaii under the pretext of seeking medical care and remain 
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there until the conditions were set for his return (Leap 1977:xi, xvi-xvii). The US, however, was 
unwilling to have Lon Nol fly directly to the US as head of state and wanted him to make a stop 
over in route where he would relinquish his official position and continue to the US as a private 
citizen. President Suharto, apparently still sympathetic to Lon Nol’s anti-communist stand and 
friendly with the US, offered to serve as a rest stop (Howland 2013:262). Importantly, Suharto 
allowing Lon Nol to escape Cambodia left open the possibility that Suharto could avoid a 
complete defeat at the hands of the PRC in a regional struggle, and it allowed Indonesia to play a 
part in a matter of great international significance.   
 On April 1st 1975 Lon Nol left Cambodia accompanied by 27 members of his family and 
close political associates, including Prime Minister Long Boret. From Phnom Penh they flew to 
Utapao Airbase in Thailand. From Thailand he flew to Jakarta and then on to Bali on an 
Indonesian national oil company jet (“Lon Nol Lands in Jakarta” 1975). Lon Nol and his party 
were put up at the Indonesian national oil company’s cottages in Bali. Once in Bali, Suharto paid 
Lon Nol a personal visit and declared his continued support for Lon Nol’s government (Nasution 
et al. 2002:49-50). Despite the pretext of departing on a heath cure it was widely understood that 
Lon Nol would not be returning to Cambodia and was likely going into exile (Andelman 1975). 
In a demonstration of just how certain Lon Nol’s associates were that there was still space to 
negotiate with the Khmer Rouge, Long Boret and several other officials returned from Bali to 
Cambodia just in time to be killed by the Khmer Rouge (Holdridge 2013:264, Becker 1986:160, 
“Lon Nol Lands in Jakarta” 1975).   
 
Conclusion 
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The victory of the Khmer Rouge on April 17th 1975 effectively ended Indonesian 
involvement in Cambodia until October of 1978 when Indonesia began to explore the possibility 
of reopening its embassy in Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, however, put 
an end to those plans (Nasution et al. 2002:70-71). Nevertheless, Indonesia went on to play an 
important role in the eventual establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, and 
maintains an active relationship with Cambodia today through its numerous ASEAN 
engagements including a long standing commitment to assist Thailand and Cambodia mediate 
their dispute over Preah Vihear Temple (Sokha 2013).  
 Indonesia was never the most important of considerations for Cambodia, and Cambodia 
was certainly never the most important consideration for Indonesia during the time period 
outlined above, but examining their interactions during this period enhances our understanding 
of the events in Cambodia from 1955 through 1975. By examining the Indonesia-Cambodia 
relationship one can better understand why Sihanouk might have felt he could pursue a neutralist 
foreign policy, and how he chose to pursue it. The Bandung Conference helped propel Sihanouk 
along his neutral course and facilitated his rise to power. It also was the starting point for 
Sukarno and Sihanouk’s friendship, which, while not the only factor, set the stage for an 
increased closeness between the two countries, which might otherwise not have come about. 
Examining the Sukarno-Sihanouk relationship helps one see that Sihanouk’s shift to the right in 
1967 and his ultimate down fall was linked to the events in Indonesia.  
 Additionally, examining the link between the destruction of the PKI and the atrocities of 
the Khmer Rouge helps to shed some light on the Cambodian path to genocide. The destruction 
of the PKI offered a path for the right in Cambodia to exert its control over Sihanouk and 
eliminate the left. For the Khmer Rouge, it likely steeled their decision to pursue an armed 
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struggle and may have even increased their determination to carry out a political genocide in the 
image of Suharto’s utter destruction of the PKI.  
Finally, the fact that the Indonesia-Cambodia relationship remained important regardless 
of the head of government in either capital from 1955 through 1975 highlights the importance 
the relationship took on for both countries. The relationship began through the friendship of 
Sukarno and Sihanouk, but endured because of the importance it took on and likely because of 
the intergovernmental relationships it generated. For Cambodia the relationship was always 
about finding an external patron to support the government against internal and external threats. 
For both Sukarno and Suharto Cambodia provided an opportunity to enhance Indonesia’s 
international image. For Sukarno, Cambodia provided a way to extend his regional influence as a 
counter weight against the PRC backed PKI, and for Suharto Cambodia provided an opportunity 
to build Indonesia’s influence against the PRC regionally and communism in general. 
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